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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Though criminal convictions followed by imprisonment 
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deprive defendants of their freedom, inmates nevertheless retain 
certain constitutionally protected property and liberty interests.  
Thus, the Due Process Clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibits the federal and state governments from 
depriving an inmate of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.1  In this case, we consider whether a state has 
interfered unlawfully with an inmate’s protected liberty interests 
with respect to the conditions of his confinement and the 
possibility of his parole and whether a state officer may have 
unlawfully retaliated against the inmate for exercising his 
constitutional rights. 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania incarcerated 
appellant Phillip Lee Fantone in 2010 in a state correctional 
institution.  The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole 
(the “Parole Board”) granted him parole, but, by reason of 
prison discipline proceedings filed against Fantone, the Parole 
Board rescinded that decision.   Fantone subsequently brought 
this case in the District Court alleging that by their wrongful 
actions, defendants, now appellees, unlawfully caused him to be 
confined in a prison Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”), which, 
in turn, led the Parole Board to rescind his parole.  Defendants 
made a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which 
the Court granted.  Fantone appeals, contending that the 
combination of the rescission of his parole and his confinement 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.  The Due Process Clauses are 
designed to protect the individual against arbitrary government 
action.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 
2963, 2975 (1974).  We are referring to the clauses in the 
singular in this opinion. 
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in the RHU infringed his legally cognizable liberty interests, 
thereby violating his right to due process of law.  He further 
charges that defendants conspired to deprive him of these due 
process rights.  Finally, he claims that correctional officer Joe 
Burger unlawfully retaliated against him by having him retained 
in the RHU after the expiration of the period of his disciplinary 
confinement because Fantone would not confess to the charges 
in the disciplinary proceedings and because he filed a grievance 
against Burger charging that Burger threatened him. 
 Perhaps the most significant legal principle leading to our 
result on this appeal is that where state law provides parole 
authorities with complete discretion to rescind a grant of parole 
prior to an inmate’s release, the inmate does not have a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled before 
his actual release.  See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 102 
S.Ct. 31 (1981).  Because Pennsylvania law provides that the 
Parole Board may rescind a determination granting parole at any 
point before it is “executed”—i.e., an inmate is released—we 
determine that Fantone did not have a liberty interest in the pre-
execution grant of parole.  Moreover, inasmuch as an inmate 
does not have a right to be confined in any particular housing 
unit in a prison, absent certain atypical and significant hardship, 
when an inmate is placed in a restrictive custody unit, his liberty 
interests have not been infringed.  See Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 532 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).  We 
therefore will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Fantone’s 
due process and conspiracy claims, as they are based on the 
rescission of his parole and the place of his confinement.  For 
the reasons set forth below, however, we will reverse the 
Court’s order dismissing his retaliation claims against Burger 
and remand that aspect of this case for further proceedings.  
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II.  JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1343(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Inasmuch as the District Court dismissed Fantone’s 
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we review all of 
its findings de novo, and, for purposes of this opinion, “accept 
the truth of all the factual allegations in the complaint and . . . 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [Fantone].”  Revell v. 
Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
IV.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Pennsylvania incarcerated Fantone as a parole violator in 
2010.2  At that time, it held him at the State Correctional 
Institution-Pittsburgh (“SCI-Pittsburgh”).  In March 2012, when 
Fantone was eligible for parole, he appeared before the Parole 
Board.  The Parole Board exercised its discretion to grant him 
parole, and it informed him of this decision on or about April 
18, 2012.  However, in the weeks between Fantone’s parole 
hearing and the Parole Board’s decision, prison officers charged 
                                                 
2 We are not concerned with Fantone’s antecedent criminal 
conduct. 
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Fantone with “cupping” methadone and transferring it to other 
inmates.  Because of these allegations, the prison officers 
transferred Fantone to the RHU.  After Fantone’s transfer, 
Burger interrogated him about the methadone charges.  Burger 
told Fantone that two nurses had seen him cupping his 
medication and that a surveillance video recorded this activity.  
Fantone alleges that during this interrogation, Burger threatened 
to “bury [Fantone] in this hole and you’ll never see population 
here and then I’ll have you shipped so far away you’ll never get 
a visit.”  App. 46.  Fantone subsequently filed a grievance 
against Burger, complaining of these threats.  
 Fantone appeared before an examiner, defendant Ron 
Mackey, for a hearing on the methadone allegations.  Defendant 
Lieutenant Fred Latini and Burger met privately with Mackey 
before Fantone entered the hearing room.  During the hearing, 
Mackey indicated that Latini and Burger had presented credible 
statements from two confidential informants supporting the 
cupping allegations.  Based on that evidence, Mackey found 
Fantone guilty of cupping his methadone and sanctioned him to 
serve 35 days in the RHU, time he already had served.  This 
disposition imposed a term of disciplinary custody, which is 
distinguishable from administrative custody as disciplinary 
custody, unlike administrative custody, is imposed as a 
punishment.   
 Fantone contends that due to procedural improprieties, he 
was denied due process of law in those proceedings.  He also 
alleges that during the hearing, Burger remained within earshot 
outside of the hearing room, listening to the proceedings through 
an open door.  Fantone further alleges that Burger informed 
Latini of Fantone’s sentence of time served but that Latini 
nevertheless ordered Fantone to remain in the RHU on 
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administrative custody status until May 8, 2012.  Then, as a 
condition of release from the RHU, the prison staff required 
Fantone to write a statement revoking his grievance against 
Burger, and he did so under duress.  
 On May 12, 2012, after being back in the general 
population for four days, the prison officers transferred Fantone 
again to the RHU on administrative custody status during the 
investigation of a second misconduct charge against him, this 
one relating to graffiti in his cell.  The hearing on the second 
misconduct charge was continued until June 12, 2012, and until 
that time, Fantone remained in the RHU.  When the hearing 
reconvened with Latini appearing as a witness, Mackey found 
Fantone guilty once again and sanctioned him to 90 days of 
disciplinary custody.  Fantone contends that as he was being 
escorted back to the RHU, Burger taunted him by “flex[ing] his 
biceps with a slow robot type gait as if in victory.”  App. 77. 
 Fantone contends, and we accept the contention in these 
proceedings, that these disciplinary actions led the Parole Board 
to rescind Fantone’s parole.  However, Fantone successfully 
obtained dismissal of both misconduct charges on administrative 
appeal due to a lack of reliable evidence.  Nevertheless, the 
Parole Board did not reinstate Fantone’s parole, and he 
remained in the RHU until the prison authorities transferred him 
to another correctional institution on November 1, 2012.  We 
were told at oral argument that Fantone was not released from 
the second institution until he had served his entire term, or in 
the vernacular, had “maxed out.” 
 On November 19, 2012, Fantone initiated a pro se civil 
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action in the District Court against Latini, Burger, and Mackey.3 
 His complaint, as later amended, set forth claims for due 
process violations, conspiracy, and retaliation.  Fantone 
attributed his loss of parole and confinement to the RHU to 
defendants’ unlawful actions.  In addition, as we have indicated, 
Fantone asserted that Burger wrongfully retaliated against him 
because he would not confess to the methadone charge and 
because he filed a grievance against Burger.  The parties agreed 
to present the case to a magistrate judge for disposition, and the 
case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy.  
Pursuant to a motion by defendants, now appellees, the Court 
dismissed this case in its entirety by order of August 8, 2013, for 
failure to state a claim.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
reasoned as follows: (1) defendants did not deprive Fantone of a 
liberty interest and thus did not infringe his due process 
protection; (2) his related conspiracy claim failed because there 
could not be a conspiracy to violate the Due Process Clause 
without a violation of the Clause; and (3) the retaliation claim 
failed because Fantone’s pleadings did not adequately claim that 
his filing of a grievance against Burger and his refusal to confess 
to the methadone allegations led to Burger retaliating against 
him.  Fantone timely filed a notice of appeal, and we now decide 
the case.4 
  
V.  DISCUSSION 
                                                 
3 There originally were other defendants, but they no longer are 
parties. 
 
4 We thank Fantone’s attorneys on this appeal for their fine 
representation of him on a pro bono basis. 
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 We are guided here by the concerns undergirding the 
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.  Under 
certain circumstances, states may create liberty interests with 
respect to inmates’ rights that are protected by the Clause, but 
these interests generally will be limited to freedom from 
restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 
(1995); see Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 
2415 (1987).   Accordingly, though inmates do not shed all 
constitutional rights at the prison gate, “‘[l]awful incarceration 
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many 
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.’”  Jones v. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2537 (1977) (quoting 
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060 
(1948)).  Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide 
range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the 
sentence imposed by a court of law.   
 A.  Due Process Claim: Fantone’s Combination Theory   
                  Does Not Create a State-based Liberty Interest. 
 The District Court properly dismissed Fantone’s due 
process claim.  In his complaint, Fantone asserts that he was 
denied due process in the methadone misconduct proceedings 
that resulted in his sentence to disciplinary confinement in the 
RHU and, in turn, led to the rescission of his parole.  The Court 
dismissed Fantone’s claim based on a determination that his due 
process rights had not been implicated in the misconduct 
proceedings because those proceedings resulted in such brief 
confinements to the RHU that, even when coupled with the 
rescission of the grant of parole, the proceedings did not 
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implicate his liberty interests.  
 The requirement that the government afford due process 
of law to the entities and individuals with whom it deals applies 
only in situations in which the governmental action implicates 
some protected life, liberty, or property interest of the entity or 
individual.  In this case, Fantone contends that the implicated 
interest relates to the place of his confinement and his possibility 
of being paroled.  The Supreme Court and this Court long have 
held that liberty interests “may arise from two sources—the Due 
Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.”  Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69 (1983) (citing 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2537-
40 (1976)); Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 409 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  Fantone concedes that he does not have a liberty 
interest arising directly from the Due Process Clause but 
contends that the combination of his confinement in the RHU 
and the rescission of his parole infringed his state-created liberty 
interests.  In short, he went from the verge of release on parole 
to being denied parole and being confined in the RHU.  His 
argument includes the contention that his liberty interests were 
implicated because the rescission of his parole effectively 
lengthened his sentence.  Though there is no question that this 
theory is thoughtful and well crafted, we reject it.  
 Sandin v. Connor provides that an inmate’s liberty 
interests generally will be limited to freedom from restraint 
imposing “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  515 U.S. at 
484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300.  Although we have not conclusively 
determined the baseline from which to measure what is “atypical 
and significant” in any particular prison system, and we do not 
do so here, we are satisfied that Fantone has not demonstrated 
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that he had a liberty interest that defendants could have 
infringed.   
 Fantone rests his “combination” argument on the 
Supreme Court decision in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 
125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005).  Wilkinson involved the placement of an 
inmate in one of Ohio’s most extreme penitentiaries, its 
“Supermax” facility, in which conditions are “more restrictive 
than any other form of incarceration in Ohio, including 
conditions on its death row or in its administrative control 
units.”  Id. at 214, 125 S.Ct. at 2389.  Once confined in the 
Supermax facility, an inmate remains there indefinitely, with 
only annual reviews.  Moreover, inmates lose parole eligibility 
while incarcerated in the Supermax facility.  Id. at 214-15, 217, 
125 S.Ct. at 2390-91.  The Wilkinson Court held that this 
combination of circumstances sufficed to create atypical and 
significant hardship, in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life, so that confinement in the Supermax facility could 
infringe an inmate’s liberty interests and the inmate therefore 
had a due process right in the procedure leading to that 
deprivation.  Id. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. at 2394-95.  In reaching its 
result the Court emphasized the facility’s extreme conditions, 
especially its “prohibition on almost all human contact,” the 
indefinite confinement, and a Supermax inmate’s “automatic 
disqualification” for parole consideration.  Id. 
These factors, however, do not commix here analogously. 
 Fantone’s circumstances do not present hardship that is atypical 
and significant when compared to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life, so it cannot be said that defendants’ actions infringed 
his liberty interests.  Id. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. at 2394-95.  The 
conditions in the RHU at SCI-Pittsburgh are quite different from 
those in the Supermax facility that the Supreme Court described 
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in Wilkinson.  As a baseline point of contrast, the RHU offers 
the inmates confined in it, whether on administrative or 
disciplinary confinement, markedly more human interaction and 
bodily movement than is allowed in Ohio’s Supermax facility.  
Wilkinson describes how the Supermax facility’s prisoners are 
kept in a single small cell for 23 hours each day and are 
permitted to leave only for one hour’s exercise.  As the Court 
described, “it is fair to say inmates are deprived of almost any 
environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human 
contact.”  Id. at 214, 125 S.Ct. at 2389.  Fantone faced far less 
restrictive constraints in the RHU.  Moreover, placement in the 
Supermax facility is indefinite, and, after an initial 30-day 
review, the placement is reviewed just annually.  Fantone, in 
contrast, was in the RHU, at least while on disciplinary 
confinement, for a set term of days, and his confinement in the 
RHU was subject to regular reviews.5  See, e.g., Stallings v. 
Werholtz, 492 F. App’x 841, 845-46 (10th Cir. 2012) (non-
precedential) (existence of periodic review of administrative 
custody in the Kansas system distinguishes it from Wilkinson).  
Finally, unlike the Supermax inmates, Fantone was not 
disqualified for parole consideration.     
This last consideration is significant: despite the language 
with which Fantone describes the rescission of his parole, he did 
not become ineligible for parole simply because of his 
placement in the RHU.  To the contrary, when the Parole Board 
rescinded Fantone’s parole, it repeated the procedural process 
                                                 
5 Requirements governing Fantone’s placement in administrative 
confinement mandated a weekly review of his placement for the 
first two months and every 30 days thereafter.  Fantone does not 
claim that there were procedural delays of review during this 
confinement. 
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that it had followed when it granted him parole as both times it 
reached its decision by exercising its discretion.  Where state 
law provides parole authorities complete discretion to rescind a 
grant of parole prior to release, an inmate does not have a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled.  See 
Jago, 454 U.S. at 23, 102 S.Ct. at 37 (Blackman, J., concurring). 
 Critically, as we have pointed out, Pennsylvania law provides 
that the Parole Board may at any time rescind an order granting 
parole until it is “executed”—i.e., the inmate is released on 
parole.  See Johnson, 532 A.2d at 52.  Though the misconduct 
allegations against Fantone probably caused the Parole Board to 
rescind his parole, and we assume as much on this appeal, 
“[n]othing in [a state’s] code requires the parole board to deny 
parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its 
absence.”  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. at 2302.  In this 
regard, we have not overlooked the fact that Fantone was 
cleared of the misconduct charges on administrative appeal.  
Rather, we will not equate such vindication with a defendant’s 
acquittal at a criminal trial following which the defendant cannot 
be punished in that proceeding for committing the offense for 
which he had been tried. 
 Ultimately, we conclude that Fantone’s due process 
argument is unvailing.  The combination of his retention in the 
RHU and the rescission of his parole did not infringe his liberty 
interests.  In reaching our result, we note that it is consistent 
with the result in non-precedential opinions of panels of this 
Court.  In Boone v. Nose, 530 F. App’x 112 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(non-precedential), a Pennsylvania inmate had been given a 60-
day term of disciplinary confinement on a misconduct 
conviction that later was reversed on administrative appeal but 
that, in the meantime, had resulted in the rescission of a grant of 
parole.  A panel of this Court found that the inmate did not have 
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a protected liberty interest to which the right to due process 
might attach.  Id. at 114.  Similarly, a panel of this Court held 
recently in Barna v. Boyce, 563 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(non-precedential), that an inmate’s placement in the RHU for 
30 days as a disciplinary sanction could not violate his due 
process rights absent a showing that placement in the RHU and 
its conditions constituted atypical and significant hardship in 
relation to ordinary incidents of prison life.  The panel 
determined that a due process protection had not been triggered 
when the inmate’s alleged misconduct resulted in the rescission 
of his grant of parole and a subsequent lengthened duration of 
confinement.  Id.6  
 Fantone did not have a liberty interest that defendants 
could have infringed because the misconduct determinations, his 
time in the RHU, and the rescission of his parole did not, either 
alone or in combination, create atypical and significant hardship 
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Fantone’s 
due process claim. 
 
 B.  Conspiracy Claim: The District Court Properly           
                     Dismissed the Conspiracy Charge.  
 As Fantone’s counsel acknowledged during oral 
argument, his conspiracy complaint “rises and falls” with his 
                                                 
6 We are not treating the cited non-precedential opinions as 
authority or binding precedent on this appeal even though we 
find their analyses helpful.  Rather, we reach our result by 
conducting our own analysis. 
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due process claims.  Because we find that Fantone does not have 
an actionable claim against defendants for the deprivation of his 
due process rights, as the alleged deprivation did not infringe his 
liberty interests, he cannot have a corresponding and dependent 
claim against them for having engaged in a conspiracy to 
deprive him of those rights.  Therefore, we agree with the 
District Court’s dismissal of the conspiracy claim.  See, e.g., 
Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2011 ) 
(non-precedential) (without grounds for an independent finding 
that a plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional right, there 
can be no claim brought against the defendants for conspiracy to 
violate those rights).7 
 C.  Retaliation Claim: The District Court Improperly    
     Dismissed the Retaliation Claim.  
 Finally, we review the District Court’s dismissal of 
Fantone’s retaliation claim against Burger that Fantone 
predicates on his confinement in administrative custody in the 
RHU.  Fantone treats this claim as being under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and we agree with this approach.  When a plaintiff makes a 
retaliation claim, he alleges that: (1) he engaged in a 
constitutionally protected activity; (2) he suffered, at the hands 
of a state actor, adverse action sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and 
(3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor 
in the state actor’s decision to take adverse action.  Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  Fantone claims that 
Burger retaliated against him because Fantone refused to 
                                                 
7 We agree with the acknowledgement of Fantone’s counsel but 
have reviewed the matter independently and have come to the 
same conclusion. 
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provide a written confession to the methadone cupping charge 
and because he filed a grievance against Burger for threatening 
him during his interrogation.  In particular, Fantone alleges that 
Burger threatened to cause him to be held in the RHU after his 
disciplinary custody term had expired, and actually did so.   
 The District Court dismissed Fantone’s retaliation claim 
for two reasons.  First, the Court found that “Burger’s verbal 
threats made during the interrogation . . . were allegedly made 
before Plaintiff had filed his grievance or engaged in any other 
type of constitutionally protected activity.”  App. 20.  Second, 
the Court determined, with respect to Fantone’s allegation that 
Burger caused him to be put in the RHU following disciplinary 
custody, that “Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly states that Plaintiff 
was placed in administrative custody ‘per Lt. Latini,’ not 
Defendant Burger.”  Id. 21.  For the reasons we explain below, 
we disagree with the Court’s treatment of Fantone’s retaliation 
allegations and determine that it failed to give proper deference 
to his pro se pleadings.  We accordingly will reverse the Court’s 
dismissal of the retaliation claim and remand the case to that 
Court for further proceedings on his retaliation claim against 
Burger.  
 1.  Fantone’s complaint sufficiently alleges that he        
                suffered adverse action motivated by his exercising 
                constitutionally protected activity. 
 
 In Count Four of the complaint, Fantone contends that 
Burger violated his First Amendment rights and sets forth, in 
three paragraphs, the retaliatory acts that he argues constituted 
such a violation.  The District Court focused on these allegations 
in discussing the retaliation claim but failed to consider that all 
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of Fantone’s protected activity, as well as all of Burger’s alleged 
retaliatory actions, should be read as events in a continuum. 
 Of course, the District Court correctly recognized that 
Burger’s threats came before Fantone filed his grievance against 
him.8  After all, the events had to be in that order because the 
grievance complained of the threats.  Fantone’s complaint, 
however, asserts that the threats came after Fantone exercised 
his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to write a confession to the 
methadone allegations, which he contended were false.  When 
we read his pro se complaint fairly, we can see that Fantone 
does describe the critical incident sufficiently: that is, Fantone 
exercised a Fifth Amendment right when he refused to write a 
confession, and Burger threatened him with retaliatory action for 
exercising that right.    
 Fantone was entitled to invoke Fifth Amendment 
protection when asked to write a confession to the methadone 
allegations.  Though we will assume without deciding that an 
inmate does not have a right to remain silent when questioned 
about allegations of prison misconduct that do not rise to the 
level of criminal activity, an inmate does have this right when 
the alleged prison misconduct included criminal acts.  The 
allegation in the first set of charges against Fantone was that he 
illegally transferred methadone, a Schedule II controlled 
substance under Pennsylvania law.  28 Pa. Code § 
                                                 
8 The filing of a prison grievance is an activity protected by the 
First Amendment.  See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F. Supp. 2d 520, 
535 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“both filing a lawsuit and filing grievances 
are protected activities”) (citing Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d 
148 (3d Cir. 2001), and Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 
(6th Cir. 2000)). 
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25.72(c)(2)(xi) (2006).  The unauthorized transfer of a Schedule 
II controlled substance is a felony.  35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
780-113(a)(30) (2006).  As such, when Fantone was asked to 
write the confession, he was protected by the Fifth Amendment, 
which “‘not only protects the individual against being 
involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal 
prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official 
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, 
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in 
future criminal proceedings.’”  Baxter v. Parmigiano, 425 U.S. 
308, 316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557 (1976) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322 (1973)). 
 Any confession to that conduct surely would have incriminated 
Fantone if the Commonwealth had instituted a criminal 
proceeding against him.9 
 2.  Fantone alleged a causal connection between his      
                protected activity and his placement in                      
                administrative custody in the RHU. 
 The District Court erroneously determined that Fantone 
did not allege that Burger played any part in his administrative 
custody commitment to the RHU.  The Court did not afford 
Fantone’s allegations in his amended complaint the liberal 
reading that Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 
594, 596 (1972), requires.  The Supreme Court explained in 
                                                 
9 We note that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fantone did not need to 
allege that his constitutional rights actually were violated—he 
needed only to claim that he invoked them and suffered as a 
direct consequence.  See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103,111-
12 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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Haines that a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” 
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers” and only can be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.’”  Id. at 520-21, 92 S.Ct. at 596; see also Erickson 
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, (2007) (“a 
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se 
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 The District Court found that “Plaintiff’s Complaint 
clearly states that Plaintiff was placed on [administrative 
custody] ‘per Lt. Latini,’ not Defendant Burger.”  App. 21.  In 
doing so, the Court did not take into account the assertions in 
Fantone’s amended complaint alleging that while Latini 
ultimately ordered that Fantone remain in the RHU on 
administrative custody, Burger listened to the misconduct 
hearing, heard Mackey commit Fantone to time served, and then 
communicated with Latini.  Fantone alleges that this 
communication led to Latini issuing his order that Fantone be 
held in administrative custody.10  Fantone also alleges that 
Burger openly mocked him and demonstrated his dominance 
over him as he was being taken to administrative custody after 
his second disciplinary conviction, conduct that supports a 
reasonable inference that Burger was involved in his 
                                                 
10 Fantone also reiterated these allegations in the briefing on 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
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confinement in the RHU.11   
 It is not unreasonable to draw an inference that there was 
a causal connection between Fantone’s attempts to exercise his 
constitutional rights, Burger’s actions, and Fantone’s subsequent 
placement in administrative custody in the RHU.  Notably, 
Burger’s threats against Fantone match the events that actually 
occurred: after Fantone refused to confess and later filed a 
grievance against Burger, he was held in the RHU for the 
duration of his time at SCI-Pittsburgh, just as Burger threatened. 
 While Fantone’s allegations do not “prove” Burger’s 
involvement in the RHU placement, they did not need to do so.  
After all, as an inmate, Fantone was not privy to private 
conversations among defendants or given insight into the precise 
activities and discussions of the prison guards or the prison 
administration.   
 In sum, the combination of facts alleged here, both direct 
and circumstantial, support though do not compel a conclusion 
that Burger engaged in a retaliatory act leading to Fantone’s 
placement in administrative custody, and at this stage of the 
proceedings we accept that conclusion for we must draw all 
reasonable inferences in Fantone’s favor.  See W. Penn 
                                                 
11 While Fantone phrased these restated allegations as facts 
lending themselves to conspiracy between Latini and Burger, the 
nature of Fantone’s pro se action requires us to interpret them in 
connection with whichever claim they support.  Haines, 404 
U.S. at 420-21, 92 S.Ct. at 596.  Because they support Fantone’s 
claim that Burger was responsible for his continued confinement 
in the RHU in retaliation for Fantone’s invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and for his filing of a grievance against 
Burger, the District Court should have taken them into account.   
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Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Though we do not know what facts will be developed at 
trial, we are satisfied that Fantone pleaded his retaliation claim 
sufficiently to survive the motion to dismiss.12   
 We hold that a proper analysis of Fantone’s retaliation 
claim would have led the District Court to find that Fantone 
sufficiently alleged that he engaged in two protected activities—
the refusal to sign a written admission of guilt and the filing of a 
grievance—which together resulted in Burger taking retaliatory 
action against him that caused Fantone to be confined to the 
RHU on administrative custody status when he otherwise would 
have been in the general population.  See, e.g., Rauser, 241 F.3d 
at 333.  Accordingly, we will reverse the Court’s dismissal of 
Fantone’s retaliation claim and remand the case for further 
proceedings with respect to Burger. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
                                                 
12 We are not concerned on this appeal with determining the 
precise period of Fantone’s administrative custody confinement 
that a trier of fact could attribute to retaliation by Burger.  
Rather, we merely hold that Fantone’s complaint can be read to 
support a conclusion that he spent some time in administrative 
custody because of Burger’s retaliation against him.  Nor are we 
concerned with the effect of Fantone’s initial conviction and 
subsequent reversal of the disciplinary charges against him.  
Though these matters may become significant at trial if the case 
gets that far, they are not germane here. 
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August 8, 2013, to the extent that it dismissed the retaliation 
claim against Burger but otherwise will affirm that order.13  The 
parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
 
                                                 
13 We are reversing only as to Burger on Fantone’s retaliation 
claim even though in his brief on this appeal he does state that 
Latini was involved in the retaliation.  In this regard, we note 
that Fantone indicates in his brief that “[t]he District Court also 
erroneously dismissed [his] retaliation claim against Appellee 
Burger,” Appellant’s br. at 29, and in Count Four of his 
complaint, he only mentions Burger as involved in the 
retaliation.  Moreover, insofar as we are aware Latini had no 
reason to retaliate against Fantone and, although he could have 
conspired with Burger to retaliate against Fantone, the District 
Court dismissed the conspiracy count, which was addressed to 
Fantone’s due process claim, and we are affirming that 
disposition.  We also point out that inasmuch as the District 
Court decided the case by granting a motion to dismiss, by 
remanding the case, we are not precluding either Fantone or 
Burger from moving for summary judgment. 
Phillip Lee Fantone v. Latini, et al, No. 13-3611, Dissenting 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The major but unarticulated premise of the majority 
opinion is that if a prisoner is suspicious that corrections 
officers have illegally retaliated against him, even though there 
is pled nothing to verify those suspicions, the complaint will 
survive a motion to dismiss.  I cannot join the majority’s 
opinion to the extent it lowers the standard of plausibility that 
inmates are required to plead to state claims of retaliation.  All 
that is now required to plead causality under the majority 
opinion is an allegation that two individuals had a 
conversation, albeit the contents of which are unknown, 
followed by some adverse action.  It is hard to imagine an 
inmate who will not be able to meet this threshold. 
 
 Fantone’s retaliation claim is against Burger, yet his 
complaint does not contain any allegation that Burger engaged 
in an adverse action against him.  Instead, Fantone alleges that 
Latini ordered him to be placed in administrative custody.  But 
notwithstanding this adverse action, the complaint does not 
include any indication that Fantone ever filed a prisoner’s 
grievance against Latini or that Latini ever threatened him.  
Nor is there any allegation that Latini was angered by 
Fantone’s refusal to sign a written confession or that he was 
aware of Burger’s threats against him. 
 
 Anticipating this potentially fatal flaw, Fantone 
attempts to draw a line from Burger to Latini.  Fantone 
predicates this argument on a conversation he observed 
between Burger and Latini, despite the fact that he could not 
hear what the two officers were discussing.  Fantone’s claim 
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therefore boils down to an allegation that, because Latini 
ordered that he be placed in administrative custody after he 
observed Burger talking to him, Latini’s order must have been 
given in retaliation for his grievance against Burger and/or his 
refusal to sign a confession.  This theory is not borne out by 
the complaint. 
 
 Fantone’s allegations of retaliation, which are echoed 
by the majority, are best summed up by his counsel in his 
reply brief: 
 
Mr. Fantone argues that he witnessed Appellee 
Burger listening to the misconduct hearing, and 
that Burger heard Appellee Mackey commit Mr. 
Fantone to time served.  He then alleges that 
Burger “communicated with Lt. Latini after the 
hearing” and, as a result, Appellee Latini 
ordered that Mr. Fantone be held on 
Administrative Custody.  He also alleges that 
Appellee Burger only mocked Mr. Fantone and 
demonstrated his dominance over him as he was 
taken to administrative custody. 
       
Fantone Reply Br. at 14.  Fantone admits that he did not hear 
any of the substance of the conversation between Burger and 
Latini. 
 
 Nonetheless, and with no further relevant facts pled, he 
invites us to draw the following inferences: (1) that Burger 
overheard that Fantone was sentenced to time served, (2) that 
Burger was angered by this, (3) that Burger relayed this anger 
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to Latini in a conversation following Fantone’s misconduct 
hearing (that Fantone acknowledges he could not hear), and 
(4) that, notwithstanding the speculation regarding the 
substance of Burger and Latini’s conversation, and the fact 
that there is no allegation that Burger otherwise had any input 
in the decision to place him in administrative custody, that 
Burger was the driving force behind Latini’s decision to place 
Fantone in administrative custody.  From these inferences, he 
concludes that Latini’s order was, in actuality, the product of 
Burger taking retaliatory action against him.  Moreover, 
Fantone asserts that the fact that Burger appeared pleased by 
Fantone’s placement in administrative custody makes it 
plausible that Latini acted because Burger wanted to retaliate 
against Fantone.   
 
 The majority suggests that these inferences are 
reasonable in light of the liberal pleadings standard afforded to 
pro se litigants.  However, even construing Fantone’s 
complaint liberally, bald speculation is insufficient to state a 
plausible claim under Iqbal and Twombly.  See Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[A] pro se complaint must 
still contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).  Fantone’s 
complaint does not include a retaliation claim against Latini, 
the officer who ordered that he be placed in administrative 
custody, and it is devoid of any allegation that Burger himself 
took any adverse action against him.  The majority glosses 
over these gaping holes in Fantone’s complaint.  But its 
recitation of the liberal pleading standard cannot substitute for 
the fact that there are no allegations connecting Latini’s 
decision to place Fantone in administrative custody with either 
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Burger’s threats or Fantone’s refusal to sign a written 
confession.        
 
 That dismissal is appropriate here comports with what 
we have said in the context of conspiracy claims.  In 
Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 588 
F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009), a published per curiam opinion, 
a pro se plaintiff alleged a “judicial conspiracy” based on the 
fact that she had observed two judges interacting, followed by 
an adverse ruling.  The plaintiff had filed claims against Judge 
Fast, alleging that conduct on the bench amounted to criminal 
behavior.  Id. at 183.   
 
 We acknowledged in that case the same difficulties that 
Fantone professes to have in pleading his retaliation claim and 
that are expressed by the majority, namely, “that direct 
evidence of a conspiracy is rarely available and that the 
existence of a conspiracy must usually be inferred from the 
circumstances.”  Id. at 184.  Nonetheless, in Capogrosso, we 
noted that the plaintiff-appellant, like Fantone, “alleged only 
that Judge Fast interacted with Judge Iglesias after presumably 
hearing her discuss her case in a hallway, and that Judge 
Iglesias’ subsequent adverse ruling gives rise to an inference 
of conspiratorial conduct.”  Id. at 185.  In the absence of 
additional facts linking the adverse action to some larger 
conspiracy, we agreed with the district court that the plaintiff 
had failed to state a cognizable claim and affirmed the 
dismissal of the complaint.  Id.   
 
 Our ruling in Capogrosso is sound and I discern no 
reason why it should not apply to Fantone’s retaliation claim.  
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Aside from the mere occurrence of a conversation that Fantone 
did not hear, there is not a single factual allegation linking 
Latini’s decision to place him in administrative custody to 
Burger’s threats or his refusal to sign a written confession.  
Such a fact is no more sufficient to state a plausible claim of 
retaliation than we have already held it to be in the context of a 
conspiracy.  The majority today departs from this principle, 
preferring, instead, to draw every inference proffered by 
Fantone, no matter how remote, speculative, or unreasonable.  
I respectfully dissent. 
